by Redaktor | May 6, 2026 | news-en
ATTENTION – THIS IS AN AUTOMATIC TRANSLATION from Polish
The Court of Appeal in Lublin, in its judgment of November 21, 2019 (case file III AUa 912/18), ruled on the issue of a widow's entitlement to a survivor's pension under the conditions of a separation granted before the death of the insured husband. The court held that separation generally precludes the acquisition of this entitlement, unless the widow had an established right to alimony from him on the date of her husband's death.
In the case, the complainant applied to the Social Insurance Institution in Lublin for a survivor's pension after her deceased husband. The widow argued that despite the separation, the spouses had effectively resumed their cohabitation, lived together, maintained a shared household, used a joint bank account, and her husband regularly provided her with funds for current expenses and cared for her due to her poor health. However, the pension authority refused the benefit, citing the lack of marital community due to the separation ordered by the final decision of the District Court in Lublin of April 9, 2013.
The applicant appealed against this decision to the District Court in Lublin, but the court found the decision to be correct. This position was also upheld by the Court of Appeal in Lublin, which, acting under Article 385 of the Code of Civil Procedure, dismissed the applicant's appeal as unfounded.
The Court of Appeal correctly emphasized that a separation order can only cease as a result of the dissolution of the marriage by divorce, annulment of the marriage, or annulment of the separation by a court decision (Article 616 of the Family and Guardianship Code). This decision is constitutive in nature, meaning that the effects of the separation cease only upon its annulment by the court. In this case, none of these conditions were met. "The mere resumption of cohabitation by separated spouses does not terminate the separation, and the effects of the separation decree continue," the justification reads.
Due to the fact that the effects of the separation continued at the time of the spouse's death, Article 70, Section 3 of the Act on Pensions and Disability Pensions from the Social Insurance Fund (FUS) applies. According to this provision, a spouse who was not in a marital relationship with her husband until his death is entitled to a survivor's pension if, on the date of her husband's death, she was entitled to alimony from him, established by a court judgment or settlement. Voluntary contributions to maintenance do not meet this statutory requirement. In this case, given the lack of a formal maintenance order, the separation decree itself constitutes an obstacle precluding the granting of the benefit, regardless of the nature of the actual relationship between the spouses. The judgment of the Court of Appeal in Lublin confirmed that a legally binding separation decree constitutes an obstacle to obtaining a survivor's pension, unless the widow had an established right to alimony at the time of the spouse's death. The court emphasized that the legal effects of separation cease only by a court ruling annulling it, while the mere resumption of cohabitation does not restore entitlement to benefits from the Social Insurance Fund (FUS).
The ruling exemplifies the consistent jurisprudence of courts adjudicating social security appeals. In its written justification, the Court of Appeal cited, among other things, the view expressed by the Supreme Court: the legal situation of a separated spouse corresponds to that of a divorced person. A departure from this principle is only possible pursuant to express statutory regulation, which is not provided for in the Pension Act. Therefore, taking into account the consequences arising from the Constitutional Tribunal's judgment in case SK 61/13, a court ruling on separation excludes the spouse's right to a survivor's pension under Article 70, paragraph 1 of the Constitution. 3 of the Pensions Act, unless she was entitled to maintenance from her husband on the date of his death (Supreme Court judgment of 27 July 2017, II UK 308/16).
The judgment is final.
by Redaktor | Apr 2, 2026 | news-en
ATTENTION – THIS IS AN AUTOMATIC TRANSLATION from Polish
In its judgment of January 29, 2026, file reference II SA/Ol 710/25, the Provincial Administrative Court in Olsztyn addressed the impact of separation and the exclusion of a spouse from inheritance on the right to a death benefit after the death of a deceased professional soldier.
Pursuant to Article 462, Section 2 of the Act on the Defense of the Homeland, death benefits are payable first to the spouse, and only in the absence of a spouse, to children and other family members. This list is exhaustive, and the administrative authority is bound by the provision and cannot be guided by considerations of equity or examine fault in the breakdown of the marital relationship. This means that de facto separation or the lack of a shared household do not deprive a spouse of priority for the benefit.
However, the court indicated that the interpretation of this provision cannot be divorced from the regulations of inheritance law. In this case, the deceased's spouse was legally excluded from inheritance pursuant to Article 940 § 1 of the Civil Code. The effect of such a ruling is retroactive (ex tunc) and results in the spouse being treated as if they had not lived to see the inheritance open.
The Regional Administrative Court found that although a death benefit does not constitute an element of the estate in the strict sense, as a property right of a special nature, it cannot be granted to a person excluded from inheritance. Consequently, the circle of entitled persons should be determined taking into account the effects of the civil court's judgment.
The ruling confirms that separation itself does not exclude a spouse's right to such benefits, but legally excluding them from inheritance may lead to a loss of priority and open the way for the deceased's children or other family members to acquire the right to the benefit. The ruling is not final
by Redaktor | Mar 4, 2026 | news-en
Note: translated from Polish
By decision of 2 December 2025 (ref. no. I CSK 3236/24), the Supreme Court once again took a position on the prerequisites for the court to establish the separation of matrimonial property, with particular emphasis on the importance of the de facto separation of the spouses and the admissibility of granting separation to a date earlier than the date on which the action was brought.
The Supreme Court unequivocally pointed out that Article 52 § 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, which provides for the possibility of establishing the separation of property on a date earlier than the date on which the action was brought in the event of de facto separation, does not create an obligation on the part of the court to issue such a decision in every case of the separated spouses. This provision only grants the court the power to rule on separation with a retroactive date, if the circumstances of a particular case so require. The key importance is not so much the separation itself, understood as the lack of cohabitation or residence, but its actual impact on the sphere of legal and property relations between the spouses.
In the justification of the decision, the Supreme Court emphasized that when assessing "important reasons" within the meaning of Article 52 § 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, it is necessary to focus on whether the de facto separation resulted in such a breakdown of property relations that prevented the spouses from cooperating in the management of joint property. Only in a situation where it was actually impossible to jointly administer the property on a date earlier than the filing of the action, can we speak of the legitimacy of establishing the separation of property with a retroactive date. The mere fact of the existence of de facto separation does not prejudge either the existence of "compelling reasons" or the date on which the separation occurred.
The Supreme Court also pointed out that the "important reasons" clause is flexible
and leaves the court a wide range of decision-making freedom, requiring an individual assessment of the facts each time. Therefore, not every form of de facto separation, even a long-term one, will be considered a sufficient basis for the court's interference in the property regime of the spouses. It is necessary to demonstrate specific, significant financial consequences, such as disorganization of the management of the joint property, the inability to make joint decisions or a real threat to the interests of one of the spouses.
In conclusion, the establishment of separation of property with a date earlier than the date of filing the lawsuit is exceptional and cannot be treated as an automatic consequence of de facto separation. What is more, this ruling emphasizes the importance of proper preparation of the action for the establishment of separation of property and the need to demonstrate in detail that the de facto separation had a real and lasting impact on the possibility of joint management of property, and was not limited only to the sphere of the personal relationship between the spouses.
by Redaktor | Feb 10, 2026 | news-en
NOTE! Automatic translation from Polish
According to the Supreme Court's judgment of November 24, 2017 (I CSK 118/17), a long-term de facto separation may constitute grounds for the court's establishment of a separation of property regime if it leads to a situation in which "cooperation in the management of joint property is prevented, the property interests of one of the spouses are infringed or seriously threatened, or there is a permanent severance of all property relations and the inability to make joint economic decisions." What does this mean in practice?
In the case at hand, the spouses entered into a marriage in 1994, but the plaintiff's long-term employment abroad led to increasing conflicts and a de facto separation in 2014. Initially, the defendant handled his financial affairs, but since 2012, these responsibilities were assumed by other people, and cooperation between the spouses ceased completely. Ultimately, the divorce was granted, and the lower courts ruled that the plaintiff had lost standing to request the establishment of a separation of property regime. However, the Supreme Court corrected this position, stating that retroactive dissolution of the community property regime is also permissible after the divorce – provided that the action was filed before the divorce decree became final.
Both the judgment in question and previous Supreme Court case law confirm that a long-term de facto separation can justify the establishment of a separation of property regime, provided it prevents effective cooperation in the management of the joint property. However, it should be remembered that in such cases, it is necessary to precisely demonstrate the existence of "compelling reasons" and to present appropriate documentation. Not every form of separation can constitute a valid reason for the establishment of a separation of property regime.
by Redaktor | Jan 8, 2026 | news-en
NOTE: translated from English
On 8 October 2025, the Act amending the Act of 25 February 1964 – Family and Guardianship Code and the Act of 17 October 2008 on the change of name and surname (i.e. Journal of Laws of 2023, item 1528) entered into force, with regard to the deadline for submitting a declaration of return to the surname used before marriage.
Pursuant to the amendment, the deadline for submitting a declaration of restitution to the name from before the marriage has been extended from three months to one year from the date on which the divorce decision becomes final. This statement, in accordance with the applicable law, must be submitted in person before the head of the Registry Office or
, in the case of staying abroad, before the consul, respectively.
The previous three-month deadline was a mandatory deadline, which meant that exceeding it resulted in the definitive loss of the possibility of using the simplified procedure of returning to the surname without the need to conduct administrative proceedings under the Act on the Change of Name and Surname.
The justification to the bill indicates that the short, three-month deadline in practice made it impossible for many divorced people to effectively exercise their right. The reasons were, among m.in, lack of knowledge about the date, emotional state related to
the termination of the marriage, illness, random situations, as well as delays in the transmission of divorce decisions by the courts to the Registry Office.
In accordance with Article 2 of the Amending Act, the transitional provision provides that in the case of persons for whom the three-month deadline has not expired before the date of entry into force of the amendment, a new, one-year deadline will apply. This means that in a situation where the divorce decree became final after 8 July 2025, the interested person may benefit
from an extended period of 12 months.
To submit the declaration, you will need: an identity document, proof of payment of stamp duty, information about the place where the marriage certificate was drawn up and the date on which the divorce decree became final. If you are making a statement abroad before a consul, you must additionally submit a copy of the final divorce judgment.
The aim of the amendment is to provide divorced spouses with a real opportunity to make a well-thought-out and informed decision regarding their name, without the need to engage
in more formalized administrative proceedings.
by Redaktor | Dec 2, 2025 | news-en
ATTENTION – THIS IS AN AUTOMATIC TRANSLATION from Polish
Pursuant to Article 5, Section 2a of the Act of February 11, 2016, on State Aid in Raising Children (consolidated text: Journal of Laws of 2024, item 1576, as amended), if a child, pursuant to a court ruling, is under the alternating care of both divorced parents, and this care is provided in comparable and repeated periods, each parent is entitled to a childcare benefit in the amount of half of the amount due for a given month.
The concept of alternating care refers to care provided pursuant to a court ruling, which is provided by both parents alternately, for subsequent, comparable periods.
Standardly, alternating care involves the child periodically living with each parent. However, the Provincial Administrative Court in Poznań, in its judgment of August 21, 2025 (ref. IV SA/Po 478/25), indicated that there is also a special variant of alternating care, known as "nest" care, which is characterized by the child not changing their place of residence, but rather the parents alternately providing care in the same place.
Therefore, since the family court's judgment required the parents to share half of the costs of maintaining and raising children, the institution specified in Article 5, paragraph 2a of the Child Welfare Act appears to fully achieve this goal by awarding half of the benefit to each parent.
As follows, in the case of nest care, the childcare benefit is awarded to the parent (or legal or actual guardian) who actually currently cares for the child. However, if care is provided alternately by both parents, even in a nest care arrangement, the childcare benefit is awarded to each of them half of the amount due for a given month.
